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*The Florida Supreme Court decided about two hundred and forty-
seven cases during the period reported from September 9, 1954 through
December 30, 1954. Those opinions (excluding memorandum decisions
and a few others not considered of sufficient importance to be noted here)
found in 74 S.2d 56 to 75 So.2d 914 are herewith reported. In addition
ten federal cases interpretative of Florida law are included. These were
found from 213 F.2d 876 to 214 F.2d 792 (1954) and 121 F. Supp. 458
to 123 F. Supp. 882 (1954).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Disciplinary proceeding. Respondent was
found guilty of professional misconduct in that he solicited professional
employment personally or by his runner. The court held that disbarment
was too severe a punishment but that suspension was justified.1
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. Priority: Recordation. Notwithstanding a Florida
Statute' making a mortgage, covering a motor vehicle, which was not
registered or noted on the face of the certificate of title for such vehicle,
invalid as against creditors of mortgagor, unrecorded and unnoted mortgage
was prior in rights to the rights of the general creditor of the mortgagor
who had not obtained a lien upon the mortgaged property.3
CIVIL RIGHTS. Punishment: Violation of prison regulations. Prosecu-
tion of a prison official under the Federal Civil Rights Act. Defendant
allegedly violated state law4 in inflicting illegal punishment on a state
prisoner for alleged violations of prison regulations. The court held that
no federal offense is charged in this case because the act does not operate
merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer
purports to act is violated, but is applicable only when some one is deprived
of a federal right by that action.5
CONFLICT OF LAWS. Contracts: Substituted service. Proceeding upon
a writ of prohibition to prohibit a circuit judge from proceeding further
in an action based upon substituted service.0 A foreign corporation, which
had qualified to do business in Florida through brokers, supplying instruc-
*Tlis issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Meyer M. Brilliant and
edited by Jerry Mosca.
1. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrell, 74 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1954).
2. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(2) (1953).
3. Murray v. G.F.C. Corp., 214 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1954).
4. FLA. STAT. § 952.05 (1951).
5. United States v. Walker, 121 F. Supp. 458 (N.D.Fla. 1954),
6. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (4951).
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tions and warranties, was engaged in a business or business venture within
Florida and was therefore amenable to substituted service.7
CONSmrtroNAL LAW. Eminent Domain. A statute gave a public
utility corporation the right by summary method, pending condenmation
proceedings, to secure a right of way or easements for the transmission
of lines for public purposes. The court held that the constitutional
guarantee 9 of due process and of adequate compensation first being paid
for property taken were not violated. The reasoning was that such action
was necessary to avoid the delays incident to condemnation proceedings.' 0
Otherwise, a few owners would be permitted to delay the taking until
damages bad been assured.'1
Admission to the Bar: Equal protection: Undue hardship. This is a
suit for a declaratory decree praying for an interpretation of a statute
12
insofar as it abolishes the diploma privilege and regulates admission to
the bar. The statute fixed an arbitrary date,13 after which all applicants
to practice law are required to take an examination. The court held that
the legislature may under its police power regulate admission to the bar
concurrently with the supreme court. The court also held that the fixing
of this date did not impose an undue hardship or deny equal protection of
the law 14 to those who could not attain a degree by the specified date.' "
Primary election. Mandamus proceeding to have the primary election
law, 16 which requires a majority vote for nomination of candidates by
political parties for election to public office, be declared in violation of
the constitutional provision' 7 that a plurality of votes is needed to elect
an elective official. The court held that it is not a violation since the
constitutional provision has reference only to final election and does not
apply to a primary or to a nomination.' 8
CoNTRAcTs. Attorney and Client: Fees. In an action by attorneys to
recover fees for legal services allegedly over and above those comprehended
by and performed under a retainer contract with the client, a judgment
adverse to the attorneys was affirmed.' "
7. State ex rel. Guardian Credit Indemnity Corp. v. Harrison, J., 74 So.2d 371
(Fla. 1954).
8. FLA. SrT. § 74.01 et seq. (1951).
9. DECLARATION Oil RIGHTS § 12; FLA. CONST. ART,. XVI, § 29; U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XIV.
10. FLA. STAT. § 74.14 (1953).
11. Belcher v..Florida Power & Light Co., 74 So.2d 56 (1954).
12. FLA. STAT. § 454.031(3) (1951).
13. Enrollment must not have been later than July 25, 1951 and the degree must
be obtained not later than July 25, 1954.
14. DECLARATION OF RmHrs, § 1; U.S. COST. AMEND. XIV.
15. Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1954).
16. FLA. STAT. § 100.061 et seq. (1951).
17. FLA. CONST. ART. XVI, § 8.
18. Wagner v. Cray, 74 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1954).
19. Turk & Newman v. Wofford, 75 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1954).
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CRIMINAL LAW. Evidence: Character. It was error for the trial court
to admit, in rebuttal of proof of the defendant's good character, which
lie had placed in issue, evidence of specific acts of bad conduct. But the
admission was not harmful or prejudicial to the rights of the defendant,
where the record left no room for reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty. 20
Former Jeopardy: Motion for a mistrial: Consent. The defendant,
charged with robbery, motioned for a mistrial which was granted. At a
later trial, the defendant made a motion to quash on the ground of former
jeopardy. The court held that the defense of former jeopardy is not
available when a mistrial is granted with the defendant's consent or when
the circumstances show an urgent necessity in the interest of justice.
21
Habeas corpus: Contempt. Habeas corpus proceeding to test the
legality of a contempt order. The trial judge had no authority to compel
the defense counsel in a trial of a criminal case to deliver to the county
solicitor a transcript used by defense counsel in his interrogation of the
prosecuting witness on cross-examination, to be used by the county solicitor
on redirect examination. The defense counsel was not guilty of contempt
for refusing to do so.
22
Habeas corpus: Opportunity to raise question at former trial. Habeas
corpus may not be used to raise for the first time questions that the
petitioner had a fair and adequate opportunity to raise, and could and
should have raised, during the former trial of the case.
23
Habeas corpus: Person designated by statute to execute death sentence.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to
death by electrocution. By petition for habeas corpus he attempted to
raise the presumption that the person designated by statute24 to execute
the death sentence might not be present to pull the switch. If such
person is not present, a deputy may perform the duty and there is no
provision in the statute for the appointment of a deputy. The court
held that the electrocutioner does not have to be identified, but only
designated by office. The statute names the first assistant engineer as
the person who shall perform the duty and the presumption is that all
public officials will carry out their duties.3
Intoxicating liquors: Sales by minor. Appellee, a female minor, was
married in 1953. Thereafter she went to work as a waitress in an establish-
ment where foods and alcoholic beverages are dispensed for consumption
20. Olsen v. State, 75 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1954).
21. McLendon v. State, 74 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1954).
22. Whitaker v. Blackburn, Jr., 74 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
23. Irvin v. Chapman, 75 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1954).
24. FLA. STAT. § 922.11 (1951).
25. North v. Chapman, 74 So,2d 787 (Fla. 1954).
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on the premises. The State Beverage Department preferred charges against
the employer for employing a person under 21 years of age in violation of a
statute.26  The court held that the statute2 7 removing the disability of
nonage of married female minors did not affect the statute making it
unlawful for vendors of alcoholic beverages to employ persons under twenty-
one years of age.
28
judge absent from view of scene. A view of the place where a homicide
occurred was ordered. by the trial judge. The trial judge voluntarily
absented himself from such view. The court held that this constituted
reversible error because by statute,29 the presence of the trial judge at
the scene of the view is mandatory, and also that this right was not
waived by the failure by the defendant to object to the view until after a
verdict of guilty.30
Nuisance: Self-incrimination. The state brought suit to restrain as a
nuisance3' an alleged lottery and bookmaking business carried on by the
defendants. The defendants interposed the defense against self-incrimina-
tion. 2 The court held that the state could not base its case solely on
the fact that the defendants had purchased a federal gambling stamp and
had paid the excise tax imposed by the United States on their gross gam-
bling income.33
Witnesses: Special agent of Federal Bureau of Investigation. A judgment
of conviction for violating federal law prohibiting dealing in interstate
commerce with motor vehicles known to be stolen will not be reversed
because a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was a witness.
The defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because the jury may have
given preponderant weight to the testimony of such witnesses because of
their standing and reputation.3'
Witnesses: Impeaching credibility by extrajudicial statement. State's
attorney attempted to impeach the credibility of the accused on cross-
examination by reading extrajudicial statements attributed to the accused
and wholly inconsistent with his prior testimony. State's attorney also
asked accused whether he had made such statements without permitting
defense counsel to examine a copy of the statements. The court held that
although the questions were withdrawn by the state's attorney and the
jury properly instructed to disregard the incident, that reversible error had
already been committed.35
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 450.070, 562.13 (1951).
27. FLA. STAT. § 743.03 (1951).
28. Hunter, Jr. v. Bullington, 74 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1954).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 914.01, 918.05 (1951).
30. McCollum v. State, 74 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1954).
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 64.11, 823.05 (1951).
32. FLA. CONST. DFCL. RIGHTS, § 12; U.S. CoNsr. AMEk-ND. V.
33. Boynton v. State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954).
34. Elder v. United States, 213 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1954).
35. Williams v. State, 74 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1954).
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. Airplane pilots had been employed by an
airline during a strike and were released at the end of the strike. They
were refused re-employment because of interference by the union. They
sought a determination of their status by proceedings for a declaratory
decree. The court held that they did not set out a case for declaratory
relief. They had to elect either to challenge the validity of their discharge,
and seek reinstatement and back pay, or to accept their discharge as final,
and bring suit for breach of contract. The declaratory decree statute"
cannot be used in a case wherein the decree prayed for would serve no
useful purpose.
37
DrvORCE. Constructive service: Fraud. The wife sought to set aside
a divorce decree granted to the husband on the ground that the affidavit
for constructive service was false and fraudulent. There had been a prior
prosecution against the husband in the same court arising from the same
affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had no right in
dismissing the wife's complaint to consider the facts and circumstances
surrounding the prior prosecution where those facts had not been made a
part of the record in the cause before it. s
Custody: Modification of decree. A petition was made for modification
of a divorce decree wherein custody of a minor child was granted solely
to the father. The court found that the evidence of changed circumstances
was sufficient to justify partial change of custody to the mother.39
E!urrY. Employment contracts: Injunction. Contracts of employment,
with provisions not to compete or to work for a competitor, will not be
enforced in the absence of special equities. A permanent injunction will
not issue to enjoin such breach of contract.40
INSURANCE. Liability. Defendant was involved in an accident while
driving a car owned and leased by U-drive-it. Both were covered by separate
insurance against liability and in different companies. However, lessor's
policy contained a clause exempting liability for such loss as is covered
on a policy in another company. The court held that defendant's insurance
company is the only one liable.41
Master and Servant: Independent contractor. A minor brought an
action for personal injuries sustained in the operation of the automobile
of the defendant's insured. The minor, for a fee, had agreed to drive the
intoxicated insured to a sanitorium in insured's automobile. Insured fell
asleep on the way. When he awoke, he attempted to take the wheel and
the accident resulted. The court held that the minor was an independent
36. FiA. S'rAT. § 87.01 et. seq. (1951).
37. Mountain v. National Airlines, Inc., 75 So.2d 574 (Fi. 1954).
38. Thames v. Thames, 75 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1954).
39. Bryan v. Bryan, 75 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1954).
40. Arond v. Grossman, 75 So.2d 593 (F7a. 1954).
41. Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1954).
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contractor and could not avail himself of any Workmen's Compensation
remedies .42
Notice of Loss: Waiver. Prospective purchaser of a truck and trailer
took them for a trial run on Thursday, after promising to return the
following Saturday. He failed to return, and the owner reported the
loss to the insurance company about five weeks after the disappearance,
filing proof of loss December 7th. The court held that the owner had
complied with the theft policy provision requiring notice to the company
"as soon as practicable" and filing of proof of loss within sixty days after
occurrence of loss. After receiving such notice the company waived any
failure of prompt notice and proof of loss because of a general denial of
liability on the ground that it was an embezzlement rather than a theft.
43
INTERNAL REVENUE. Confiscation and forfeiture of car: Gambling tax.
A libel seeking forfeiture of an automobile used in gambling operations
by the owner who had not paid the gambling occupational tax.44 The
court held that the automobile was not subject to a forfeiture on such
grounds because the forfeiture statutes45 never contemplated forfeitures
except where the car is used in those activities which the federal government
is attempting to prohibit, such as illegal dealings in alcoholic beverages and
narcotics.
46
LABOR RELATIONS. Agriculture workers: Exemption. The work per-
formed by the employees of a fruit company in hauling fruit from thc
farms to the employer's place of business was not part of an essential to
the growing and producing of fruit, within the meaning of the Act.
47
Therefore, such employees were not agriculture workers and exempt from
the Act.
48
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Caveat emptor: Injuries. The tenant had the
same opportunities as the landlord to discover defects in the premises at
the time of leasing. Therefore, the rules of caveat emptor applies and
the tenant takes the property as he finds it. The court held that the
tenant did not have a cause of action for injuries sustained when plaster
fell from the ceiling which had begun to deteriorate prior to the time
of the lease.
49
LEASE: Renewal. A lease provided for additional annual renewals. Use
of the word "renewal" in the absence of other clauses, did not make the
execution of a new lease mandatory. The lessee had otherwise complied
42. National Surety Corp. v. Windham, 74 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1954).
43. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Burson, 213 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1954).
44. 65 STAT. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. § 3290 (1953).
45. 53 STAT. 401 (1936), 26 U.S.C. § 3116 (1944).
46. United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile, 122 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
47. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1060, 13(a)(b), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. 213 (a)(b) (1949).
48. Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1954).
49. Sampson v. Stanley Corp., 75 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1954).
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with the requirements necessary to the exercise of the option for the further
term. The court held that the failure of the parties to "execute" a new
lease did not operate to eliminate the lessee's rights under the renewed
lease.50
MECHANicS LIEN. Loss of Profits. The Mechanics' Lien Law5' gives a
lien only for work done and material furnished, so that overhead and
profits, as separate items, are not within the purview of the act.
5 2
Notice of intention to claim a lien: Privity. Plaintiff, owner of a certain
lot, made a contract to have the contractor erect three houses thereon.
Defendant furnished material for such construction and says there was
due it the sum of $777.14. The court held that the plaintiff was not in
privity with the material man, had paid the contractor as per terms of
the contract and had no notice of intention to claim a lien. 53 Appellee
could claim a lien for no amount larger than the sum remaining due on
the contract at the time the service of the notice was made.
54
MASTER AND SERVANT. Directed Verdict: Wilful injury. Appellant
charged that defendant corporation, through its employees or agents acting
within the scope of their employment, had him falsely arrested and violently
beaten without provocation, thereby causing him pain, anguish, humiliation,
and loss of time in his employment. The court reversed a verdict directed
for the defendant, and held that to justify directing a verdict, every inference
favorable to the party against whom it is directed must be accorded. If
reasonable men might differ as to whether any relief could be granted, then
the motion for a directed verdict 5 must be denied. The evidence was
sufficient to take the case to the jury.56
MORTGAGES. Eminent Domain: Limited right to repay. A proceeding
was initiated to condemn land encumbered by a mortgage which limited
the right of the mortgagors to repay the indebtedness. The award money
was paid into the registry of the court. The court held that the mortgagee
had to make an election. He could elect to receive the full principal of
the mortgage indebtedness out of the award moneys, plus unpaid interest
up to the date of the distribution orders, or elect to release his lien57 against
the award moneys and the land and thereafter look solely to the mortgagors
personally for the principal and future interest.58
50. Leibowitz v. Christo, 75 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1954).
51. FLA. STAT. § 84.01 et. seq. (1951).
52. Surf Properties, Inc., v. Markowitz Bros. Inc., 75 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1954).
5?). FLA. STAT. § 84 (1951).
54. Beam v. Jerome Lumber & Supply Co., 74 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1954). Provision
of FLA. STAT. § 84.05(11) (1953) requiring owner of property dealing with contractor
to withhold 20% of contract price to insure payment of laborers and materialmen, not
applicable (enacted after contract executed).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (1950).
56. Collazo v. John W. Campbell Farms Inc., 213 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1954).
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.01, 73.02, 73.11, 73.12 (1951).
58. Watts v. Duval County, 75 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1954).
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ESTATE BY ENTIRETY: Subsequent Assignment of Mortgage and Note
to Wife. Husband and wife bought a tract of land and took title as an
estate by the entirety. They gave a purchase-money mortgage, both signing
the note. The mortgagees subsequently assigned the note and mortgage
to the wife. The wife could not enforce the mortgage against her own
property. By the purchase of the note, she had simply paid the debt.5 9
Statute of Limitations: Taxes. A twenty year statute of limitations6
applicable to mortgages did not apply to an amount paid out by the
mortgagee for taxes on mortgaged property, since that was not part of the
original mortgage debt. The mortgagee was entitled to recover such amount
in a mortgage foreclosure suit commenced more than twenty years after
maturity of the secured debtY1
Forfeitures: Usury. Lenders, in consolidating plaintiff's debts, retained
part of the loan to discharge plaintiff's mortgage which was held by a third
person. But, instead of paying such prior mortgage immediately, the
lenders made only the regular monthly payments in the name of the
plaintiff. The court held that such a delay in paying the prior mortgage
constituted a delay in the advancement of a substantial portion of the
loan. The absence of an abatement of the interest on the amount so
retained, constituted a violation of the usury statute. 2  The forfeitures 3
are to be double the amount of interest already paid.
6 4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Civil service. Civil service regulations
required that employees in a classified service must serve a probationary
period before their employment status became permanent. A fireman
sought to have his military service while on leave from the fire department
credited toward his completion of such probationary period. The court
held that there could not be any such credit and that to be eligible to
participate in a promotional examination for fire lieutenant, he must have
completed the two years. 65
Zoning: Ordinance unconstitutional in part. Proceeding on an applica-
tion for a building permit to construct a gasoline station in a business
zone. Part of an ordinance 66 that was severable could be severed from
the part of the ordinance that was unconstitutional because it represenhts
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and because of
vagueness.
67
59. Brocato v. Brocato, 74 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
60. FLA. STAT. § 95.28 (1951).
61. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
62. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1951).
63. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1951).
64. Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
65. City of Miami v. Crews, 75 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
66. LAKELAND ZONINC ORDINANCE § 7 (1950).
67. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
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NATURALIZATION. Ineligibility. Exemption from serving in armed forces.
An alien who applies or has applied for exemption or discharge from training
or service in the armed forces of the United States, on the ground that
he is an alien, and is exempted on such a ground, shall be permanently
ineligible to become a citizen of the United States.68
NEGLIGENCE. Last clear chance. While appellant was operating a sur-
veyor's transit in an intersection, he was struck by appellee's truck. The
court charged the jury on the law of contributory negligence, but refused
to instruct on the doctrine of last clear chance. It was held that, whether
driver had the time and means to avert the accident was for the jury, and
refusal to charge on the doctrine of last clear chance constituted harmful
error.6
9
Insurance: Mistrial. The plaintiff was struck by an automobile and
sues the owner and also the driver, who was driving with the owner's
consent, for the injuries sustained. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff in the amount of $75,000. The defendants appealed and assigned
as error a denial of their motion for a mistrial because the plaintiff's
attorney, during the voir dire examination, asked jurors if they had any
interest in any insurance company. The court affirmed the verdict for
the plaintiff.70
REAL PROPERTY. Declaratory Judgment: Ejectment. Suit by a pur-
chaser at a sheriff's sale for a declaratory decree declaring his rights to the
land, which was in the defendant's possession. The court held that where
the defendant held under an unrecorded deed71 executed by a judgment
debtor before the judgment, the purchaser had an action in ejectment,
and a suit for a declaratory judgment would not lie for the purpose of
trying title to real property.
72
FIXTURES. A lease required the tenant to provide air conditioning
equipment at his own expense. Also, it provided that the trade fixtures
should remain the property of the tenant and he could remove same at
the expiration of his lease, provided that the removal could be made without
damage to the premises. The court held that the air conditioner, the
condensers, motors and compressors housed in the basement of the building
were trade fixtures and did not become part of the realty.
73
Homestead: Abandonment: Judgment. A proceeding in equity to
subject certain real estate of the defendant to the payment of a judgment
secured against the defendant the judgment was promulgated May 1, 1953.
Prior to the entry of this judgment and while the suit was pending, the
68. In re Mauderli, 122 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
69. Wawner v. Sellic Stone Studio, 74 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
70. Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
71. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1951).
72. Cape Sable Corp. v. McClurg, 74 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1954).
73. Ridgefield Investors, Inc. v. Holloway, 75 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1954).
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defendant filed her claim for homestead exemption to the property. The
defendant did not live on the property from May, 1952 to April, 1953. The
court held that since the defendant had sound reasons for being way from
the property, that no abandonment of the homestead right resulted and
the judgment was not effective against the property.7
4
PROCEDURE. Appeal and error. Persons, whose petition for intervention
had been properly denied and who had been allowed ten days within
which to file a brief as amicus curiae on constitutional questions involved,
were not parties to the proceeding, and had no right or authority to
prosecute an appeal therefrom. 5
Custody of minor: Parties to Agreement. The parents of a minor
child made an agreement whereby the father was to get custody of the
child. This agreement was incorporated in the court decree. The grand-
mother of the child brings a petition for leave to file a bill in the nature
of a bill of review to set the decree aside on the ground that such agreement
was infected with deceit. The court denied such petition because the
grandmother was not a party to the agreement but considered the appeal
as a writ of certiorari.
7 6
Deportation: Re-entry into United States. A habeas corpus proceeding
to test a deportation order. The alien was on a fishing vessel when it
became necessary to enter a foreign port because of bad weather. Such
entry was made without any intent or knowledge on the part of the alien.
When the alien made false representations that he was an American
citizen when the vessel re-entered the United States, the court held that
he was not subject to deportation because his entry into a foreign port
without intent to leave the United States did not constitute a fraudulent
re-entry.
77
Equity: Objection to the use of a master. The chancellor referred
the case to a master with instructions to hear witnesses and to make findings
of fact based on testimony taken before him, and also to report findings
as well as conclusions relative to the law applicable. 8 The plaintiff objected
to the use of a master. The court held that in the face of such an objection,
the chancellor did not have the power to use a master.
7 9
JURISDICTION: The grant bail to a parolee. The circuit court does not
have power or jurisdiction 0 to grant bail to a parolee who is held under
74. Saint-Gaudens v. Bull, 74 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1954).
75. State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 75 So.2d I (Fla. 1954).
76. Thomasson v. Angel, 74 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1954).
77. Savoretti v. United States ex rel. Pincus, 214 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1954).
78. Acts of 1931, c. 14658, § 57; RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3.14(b):
FLA. CONST. Art. 5, §§ 11, 14, 19, 20.
79. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1954).
80. FT.. STAT. § 947.22(l) (1951).
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a parole violation warrant issued by the FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, in the
absence of discretion by such commission.".
Mandamus: Expulsion from a club without notice. A club member
was expelled from a country club without any notice or a hearing. He
seeks reinstatement by mandamus proceedings. Without being concerned
with the merits of the case, the court held that there was a denial of
procedural safeguards and hence a violation of the "principles of natural
justice."
8 2
STATUTES. Libel and Slander: Statute of limitations. In the absence
of a savings clause, plaintiff's disability by reason of insanity existing when
a right of action for slander of title accrued would not toll the running
of the statute of limitations,
8 3 which is two years.8 4
TAXES. Income: Interest deduction. Action against the United States
for federal income taxes paid and for interest thereon. The plaintiff paid a
larger tax than was allegedly due because certain interest payments made
by him to his wife for money loaned by the wife to him, were disallowed
as deductions from his income. The court held, that since the loans from
his wife were bona fide, he was entitled in determining his liability for
federal income taxes85 to deductions for interest paid upon such loans.8 6
Cooperation by taxpayer: Wilful evasion. The defendant was charged
with attempting to defeat and evade paying income taxes.8 7 He had made
no attempt to conceal his activities and made every effort to cooperate
with the agents of the Internal Revenue Department in ascertaining the
facts. The court held that the presumption that the evasion had not been
wilfully attempted would have to be repelled by clear and convincing
evidence in order to authorize a conviction.
88
TORT. Libel and slander: Privilege. The State Insurance Commissioner
held a hearing relative to whether or not an insurance agent's license should
be revoked. The plaintiff sought to recover for allegedly libelous statements
made during the course of the hearing. The court held that the hearing
was quasi-judicial in nature and that any defamatory words published were
absolutely privileged so long as they were relevant and material to the
subject matter of the inquiry.89
TRADE-MARK. Infringement: Unfair competition. Plaintiff brings a civil
action for trade-mark infringement and unfair competition. Plaintiff used
a trademark consisting of the name and picture of Johnnie Walker in its
81. Blackburn v. Jackson, 74 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1954).
82. LaGorce Country Club v. Cerami, 74 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1954).
83. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1951).
84. Watson v. Chyna, 75 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1954).
85. 52 STAT. 460 (1.938), 26 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1943).
86. Virgin v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1954).
87. 52 STAT. 513 (1938), 26 U.S.C. § 145(b) (1943).
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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES
whiskey business. The defendant used the name Johnnie Walker as a trade-
mark in its cigar business. The court held that the trade-mark belonged
to the plaintiff and was infringed by the defendant. 0°
WILLS Attestation: Witnesses. A will, which was executed by the
testator in the presence of two witnesses, who saw the testator place his
signature thereon, and to whom he declared that the will was his last
will and testament, was invalid 91 in view of the fact that only one of such
witnesses subscribed his name to the will; the other refusing to do so.
92
Attorney's Fee: Undue influence. Counsel for the proponent of a
second will claims a fee from the estate. The second will was declared
void because secured by undue influence.9 The court held that the
attorney had brought nothing to such estate and was not entitled to be
paid by it, notwithstanding that he had acted in good faith.
94
Competency. A suit to set aside a trust agreement on the ground
that the settlor was aged, infirm, senile, and unable to understand the
nature and effect of the agreement. The court held that feebleness of body
or mental weakness does not tend to create a presumption of incompetence,
and the evidence sustained a finding that the settlor was competent. 95
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Administrator: Dependents. An adminis-
trator could not recover compensation for the death of an employee who
was killed in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,
but who left no dependents. 96 A showing of dependency is a prerequisite
to recovery of compensation for the death of an employee.91
Award: Impaired earning capacity. An award was made for a non-
scheduled injury9" based upon a finding that the bodily function as a whole
had been impaired. The court held that the award must be set aside because
it was not based upon a finding that the earning capacity had been
impaired .99
Benefits: Negligent third party. The widow of a workman killed while
in the scope of his employment by a negligent third party was entitled to
the benefits provided for by statute 00 whether she recovered from the
negligent third party or not.101
Course of employment. During a lull in his work due to a rainstorm,
the claimant drove to a nearby stand for coffee. He was injured by reason
90. John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Tampa Cigar Co., 124 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.
Fla. 1954).
91. FLA. STAT. § 731.01 et. seq. (1951).
92. In re Estate of Isaac Watkins, 75 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1954).
93. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.14, 734.01(2) (1951).
94. Redfern v. Brunstetter, 74 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1954).
95. Murrey v. The Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville, 74 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1954).
96. FLA. STAT. § 440.01 et. seq., 440.16(2)(a)-(f) (1951).
97. Amsler v. Sox Meat Packers, Inc., 75 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1954).
98. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02(9), 440.15(3)(a) (1951).
99. Ball v. Mann, 75 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1954).
100. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.16, 440.39(3) (1951).
101. Cushman Baking Co. v. Hoberman, 74 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1954).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
of a hazard existing in the roadway adjacent to the employer's premises.
The court held that the accident arose out of and in the course of
employment. Although he was employed by two employers, the one he
was working for at the time of the accident is the only one liable to him.
10 2
Divorce: Common law wife. Workmen's compensation proceedings
brought by a woman claiming to have become the common-law wife of
the decedent after she had received a final decree of divorce from the
decedent. The court held that the evidence justified a finding that
although the claimant and the decedent had lived together following their
divorce, something was yet to be done to complete a common-law
marriage.' 03
Dual employment: Special employer. The managers of adjoining hotels
entered into an arrangement whereby the beach boys employed by each
hotel were to participate in water shows presented by the other hotel on
its own premises and under its direction. A beach boy regularly employed
by one of the hotels was injured while working on the other hotel's premises.
The court held that the hotel putting on the show was a special employer'
04
and liable for the injuries sustained. 05
Suit against third person. Employees had been injured in a collision
with a third party's truck, and neither the employer nor its insurance
carrier had sued the third party within one year.106 The employees were
entitled to bring an action for the sole benefit of themselves or their
dependents and could recover full damages, notwithstanding the fact that
they had, meanwhile, received full compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law.'
0 7
Suspension of payments: Wilful violation of safety regulations. Plaintiff
was injured in an automobile accident. The carrier suspended payments
on the ground that claimant's injury was occasioned by his refusal to
observe safety regulations. 08 The violation was that he was travelling over
sixty miles per hour and attempting to pass two cars while on the left
side of the road when the accident occurred. The court held that the
evidence does not justify the conclusion that claimant knowingly and
wilfully committed the violation of the statutory safety rule.'09
ZONING. Estoppel: Rescission. The Board of County Commissioners
rezoned 10 certain land from an agricultural classification to one wherein
102. Narrania Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms Inc., 74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
103. Persico v. Samac Corporation, 74 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1954).
104. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01, 440.02(2) (1951).
105. Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1954).
106. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01 et. seq. (1951).
107. Holmes v. Carroll, 75 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1954).
108. FIA. STAT. § 317.22 (1951).
109. White v. C. H. Lyne Foundry & Machinc Co., 74 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1954).
110. FLA. Sp. ACTS 1947, c. 24592.
QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES
construction of a drive-in theatre was specifically authorized. In reliance
thereon, the owner of the land made large expenditures for sound equipment
and for preparation of the land for such use. The commissioners then
rescinded their classification. The court held that such rescission was
illegal and void under the principles of equitable estoppel.
111
Ill. Bregar v. Britton, 75 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1954).
